

JIPSS

JOURNAL FOR INTELLIGENCE,
PROPAGANDA AND SECURITY STUDIES

Published by ACIPSS Vo1. 13, No. 2/2019

DESINFORMATION UND COVID-19: ÖSTERREICH UND DIE EUROPÄISCHE DIMENSION

von David C. Jaklin

PANDEMIE-DISKURSE: ÜBER DIE MANGELNDE FÄHIGKEIT, MIT UNSICHERHEIT ZURECHTZUKOMMEN

von Manfred Prisching

THE POWER OF FEAR. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE, THE POLITBURO, AND THE 1979 THREAT FROM AFGHANISTAN

by Michael Fredholm

INDIA'S SECURITY OUTLOOK: AN EXPLANATION THROUGH THE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES APPROACH

by Aditi Malhotra

"WE NEVER SLEEP!" A DISCUSSION WITH BRIGADIER GENERAL (RET.) YOSSI KUPERWASSER

by Adrian Hänni and Duncan Bare



MEDIENINHABER, HERAUSGEBER UND VERLEGER

Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (ACIPSS)

HERAUSGEBERKOMITEE DIESER AUSGABE

Paul Schlieffsteiner (Koordination)
Patrick Sensburg
Adrian Hänni
Jeremy Stöhs
Dieter Bacher
Wolfgang Göderle

REDAKTION/EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Martin Moll (Chefredakteur/Executive Editor)
Sarah Lang (Rezensionsredakteurin/Reviews Editor)
Jamie Harrison (Korrektorat und Redaktion englischsprachiger Beiträge/English Language Editor)
Dieter Bacher, Paul Schlieffsteiner, Jeremy Stöhs, David Jaklin, Carolin Schlieffsteiner (Redakteure/Editors)

EDITORIAL OFFICE UND VERLAGSANSCHRIFT

ACIPSS
Attemsgasse 8/III, 8010 Graz, Austria
office@acipss.org
www.acipss.org

BLATTLINIE

Das Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (JIPSS) dient der Publikation von Forschungsergebnissen und der Diskussion von Fragen der Nachrichtendienste, Propaganda und Sicherheitspolitik.

LAYOUT

Alexander J. Pflieger & Melissa Pflieger

COVER

Foto von Ilkin Zeferli, lizenziert via Shutterstock (Nr. 1727589901), künstlerisch interpretiert von Alexander J. Pflieger.

Die Publikation des JIPSS wird durch eine Förderung des Landes Steiermark ermöglicht.

The publication of JIPSS is made possible thanks to the generous support from the government of Styria.

HERSTELLER

ÖH-Servicebetriebe Graz

ISSN 1994 4101

© ACIPSS

JIPSS is listed by

EBSCO

JIPSS ADVISORY BOARD

Die JIPSS-Redaktion überarbeitet derzeit ihre Arbeitsprozesse, um insbesondere das neue Double-blind-Peer-Review-Verfahren besser integrieren zu können. Darin soll das Advisory Board künftig aktiver eingebunden werden. Gleichzeitig würden wir es gerne erweitern und diversifizieren. Sollten Sie über entsprechende (akademische oder praktische) Qualifikationen verfügen und sich einbringen wollen, würden wir uns über eine Kontaktaufnahme freuen: office@acipss.org. Wenn Sie schon bisher unserem Advisory Board angehört haben, danken wir Ihnen sehr für Ihre Mitarbeit. Sollten Sie uns auch zukünftig unterstützen wollen, würden wir uns darüber sehr freuen und ersuchen ebenfalls um eine kurze Nachricht an office@acipss.org.

The JIPSS editorial team is currently revising its work processes, with a particular focus on better integrating the new double-blind peer review process. The Advisory Board is to be more actively involved in this in the future, and consequently, we would like to expand and diversify it. If you have appropriate (academic or practical) qualifications and would like to contribute, we would be pleased to hear from you: office@acipss.org.

If you have already been a member of our Advisory Board, we thank you very much for your service. If you would like to continue to support us in the future, we would be very pleased to hear from you as well and would ask you to send a short message to office@acipss.org.




Die Beiträge geben die Meinungen der Verfasserinnen und Verfasser, aber nicht zwingend jene der Redaktion, von ACIPSS oder des Herausgeberkomitees wieder. Trotz intensiver Bemühungen und sorgfältiger Bearbeitung erfolgen alle Angaben und Informationen ohne Gewähr. Haftungen von ACIPSS, des Herausgeberkomitees, der Redaktion oder der Autorinnen und Autoren sind ausdrücklich ausgeschlossen. Die verwendeten Fotos, Bilder, Grafiken und Zeichnungen etc. wurden – außer in jenen Fällen, in denen es anders vermerkt ist – von den Autorinnen und Autoren geliefert, die laut Autorenrichtlinien ausdrücklich für die Beachtung und gegebenenfalls den Erwerb der notwendigen Bild- bzw. Reproduktionsrechte verantwortlich zeichnen. Bei allfälligen Verstößen gegen die Urheber- oder Werknutzungsrechte haben sich deren Inhaber direkt an die Autoren zu wenden.

All opinions expressed are those of the individual authors, and not necessarily those of the editors, ACIPSS's, or the editorial committee. Despite intensive efforts and careful processing, no responsibility is taken for the correctness of this data or information. Any liability of ACIPSS, the editorial committee, the editors or the authors is excluded. All photographs, images, graphics and drawings etc. used (except in cases where otherwise noted) are supplied by the authors, who are, as it is explicitly stated in the guidelines for authors, ultimately responsible for adhering to copyright laws and, if necessary, the acquisition of reproduction rights. In the event of any copyright or reproduction right infringements, the owners of said rights have to contact the individual author(s) directly.

INHALT / CONTENTS

6 EDITORIAL: ADRIAN HÄNNI, Crypto, Corona & Co.

Topical Essays

- 12 **MANFRED PRISCHING**, Pandemie-Diskurse: Über die mangelnde Fähigkeit, mit Unsicherheit zurechtzukommen
- 27 **DAVID CHRISTOPHER JAKLIN**, Desinformation und COVID-19: Österreich und die europäische Dimension 
- 45 **ADITI MALHOTRA**, India's Security Outlook: an Explanation through the Concentric Circles Approach
- 54 **ANTONIO-MARIA MARTINO**, Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters: Aktive Rückholung oder Strafverfolgung in der Region?
- 71 **KATHARINA LANGWALD**, Formen und Institutionen nachrichtendienstlicher Kooperation auf EU-Ebene: Ein Forschungsüberblick 
- 84 **KURT HAGER**, Sicherheitspolitik in Österreich. Erkenntnisse aus der Ratspräsidentschaft und aktuelle Herausforderungen
- 89 **GLENN HASTEDT**, The Mueller Report: Its Origins, Findings, and Potential Significance
- 104 **MICHAEL FREDHOLM**, The Power of Fear. Soviet Intelligence, the Politburo, and the 1979 Threat from Afghanistan 
- 123 **SIEGFRIED BEER**, Recherche, Synthese, Consulting: Die Forschungs- und Analyseabteilungen des US-Kriegsgeheimdienstes COI/OSS und Österreich, 1941-1945/50
-

Interview


- 135 "We Never Sleep!" A Discussion with Brigadier General (Retired) Yossi Kuperwasser of the IDF Intelligence Research Division about Jointness in Intelligence and the Israeli Approach by Adrian Hänni and Duncan Bare
-

Documentation

- 144 **THOMAS GOISER, CLAUDIA KÖRMER**, Bewachung ohne Ausbildung, ohne Standards? Erkenntnisse und Impulse aus dem KIRAS-Projekt AQUUS: Ausbildungs- und Qualitätsstandards für SicherheitsdienstleisterInnen
- 152 **DAVID CHRISTOPHER JAKLIN**, Militärische Geheimdienste am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs/Military Intelligence on the Eve of the First World War
-

Book & Film Reviews

- 157 Katherine Ellison, Susan Kim (eds.), A Material History of Medieval and Early Modern Ciphers. Cryptography and the History of Literacy; Katherine Ellison, A Cultural History of Early Modern English Cryptography Manuals (Sarah Lang)
- 160 Walter Fuchs, Roland Sedivy, Thomas Simon, Das k.u.k. Verbrecheralbum/The Criminal Album of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Christian Bachhiesl)
- 162 Vince Houghton, The Nuclear Spies. America's Atomic Intelligence Operation against Hitler and Stalin (Martin Moll)
- 164 Thomas Riegler, Österreichs geheime Dienste. Vom Dritten Mann bis zur BVT-Affäre (Walter Blasi)
- 166 Jeffrey D. Simon, The Alphabet Bomber. A Lone Wolf Terrorist Ahead of his Time (Florian Hartleb)
- 168 Florian Hartleb, Lone Wolves – The New Terrorism of Right-Wing Single Actors (Jannis Jost)
- 171 Michael V. Hayden, The Assault on Intelligence. American National Security in an Age of Lies (Siegfried Beer)
- 174 Mark M. Lowenthal, The Future of Intelligence (Johanna Fürst)
- 176 Propaganda: The Art of Selling Lies (Stefan Auer)
- 178 The Distant Barking of Dogs (Cordula Simon)
-

*Michael Fredholm***THE POWER OF FEAR. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE, THE POLITBURO, AND THE 1979 THREAT FROM AFGHANISTAN****Michael Fredholm**

Professor, historian and former military analyst, currently Head of Research and Development at IRI, Stockholm. He has published extensively on the history, defense strategies, security policies, intelligence services, issues related to terrorism, and energy sector developments of Eurasia.

Contact: michael.fredholm@hotmail.com

Zusammenfassung:

DIE MACHT DER FURCHT. SOWJETISCHE GEHEIMDIENSTE, DAS POLITBÜRO UND DIE BEDROHUNG SEITENS AFGHANISTANS 1979

Während der ersten Jahrzehnte ihres Bestandes begegnete die Sowjetunion von allen Seiten existenzbedrohenden äußeren Bedrohungen, insbesondere seitens einer westlichen Allianz gegenrevolutionärer Regierungen, die mit Truppen im Russischen Bürgerkrieg intervenierten. Gleichwohl stammte eine besonders ernste Bedrohung von den pan-islamischen Gefühlen der Muslime in Zentralasien und im Kaukasus. Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan 1979 war in erster Linie das Resultat der Sorge, dass Afghanistan nach seinem Übertritt ins westliche Bündnis pan-islamische Aufstände im sowjetischen Teil Zentralasiens befeuern könnte. Diese bei der sowjetischen militärischen Führung unpopuläre Intervention gehörte zur Strategie der UdSSR, ihr Territorium zu verteidigen, aber nicht, neues zu gewinnen. Die sowjetische Führung intervenierte aus Angst vor erwarteten negativen Folgen und um ihr Land vor Angriffen muslimischer Fanatiker zu schützen. Allerdings erhielt als Hauptergebnis der Intervention die antisowjetische Allianz die Möglichkeit, muslimische Extremisten als Waffe gegen die UdSSR einzusetzen. Der sowjetische Einmarsch und die Reaktion des Westens gaben dem islamischen Extremismus und Terrorismus eine ideale Chance, sich selbst als ein wichtiger Faktor der Weltpolitik zu etablieren. Getrieben von der Macht der Furcht, strebte die sowjetische Führung Sicherheit an; allerdings ist das psychologisch motivierte Streben nach Sicherheit ein unverlässlicher Begleiter beim Treffen von Entscheidungen. Die Ergebnisse waren katastrophal – sowohl für die Sowjets als auch für den Rest der Welt.

SOVIET FEARS

During the first decades of its existence, the young Soviet Union faced external, existential threats from all sides, most obviously from Britain and other counterrevolutionary governments which sent military force to intervene in the Russian Civil War. Even so, one particularly serious threat emanated from the Muslims of Central Asia and the Caucasus. In Soviet Central Asia, the anti-Bolshevik Bas-

machi revolt broke out in the Ferghana valley in 1918. Although the Basmachi had been defeated in the plains by 1923, fighting continued until 1928 in the mountains and until at least 1936 in the Turkmen steppes.¹ A number of Turkish officers supported the Basmachi, while Afghan King Amanullah (1892-1960, r. 1919-1929) made contact with the insurgents and sent agents, mullahs, and troops into Soviet territory. The Basmachi uprising, and the support the Basmachi received from both Tur-

key and Afghanistan, scared the Bolsheviks. Thus, Afghanistan presented a threat to the Soviet Union from Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic activities since the very beginning of Soviet political power. Even when the Soviet Union had gained undisputed power in both Central Asia and the Caucasus, the perception of a clear and present threat from Central Asia remained. The Soviet leaders never forgot what they assessed as three linked problems and dangers:

1. Pan-Turkic sentiments in Soviet Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia, fanned from Turkey.
2. Pan-Islamic sentiments in Soviet Central Asia, fanned from Afghanistan.
3. Banditry linked to a generally rebellious attitude among Muslims against Russian and Soviet domination in both Soviet Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia.

Each of these three threats would bring significant repercussion on twentieth-century political developments.² But it was not the threats as such which materialized. Instead it was the attempts by Soviet leaders to forestall the threats which resulted in disastrous consequences, for the Soviets and for others. With regard to Afghanistan, the threat was real enough, but it was the actions of the Soviet lead-

ers, motivated by fear of the dangers that might come out of the country, which set the events in motion.

FEAR AS A DRIVER OF POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

The concerns of the Soviet leaders constituted a prime example of the power of fear. For psychological reasons, fear is a powerful motivator for human actions. The psychologist Abraham Maslow, in his well-known theory of human motivation, noted that as long as the physiological needs (food, water, and so on) are relatively well gratified, a new set of needs emerges, which he categorizes as the safety needs.³ Safety becomes the primary concern. However, the need for safety is most commonly expressed by the feeling of fear: fear of losing security, possessions, social contacts, and influence. It is this fear which frequently drives political actions, and it will be shown that Soviet fear certainly had a momentous effect on Soviet policy towards Afghanistan. Fear also drives the process of issuing intelligence requirements, that is, the assignment of priorities to intelligence services. Intelligence requirements are expressed in terms of perception of threats, not fears. Yet, these perceptions certainly reflect the fears of policy-makers, and at times perhaps also of the intelligence officers assigned to the tasks.

This paper will examine the changing focus of Soviet intelligence in Afghanistan, from the early years of Soviet power up to the Soviet Politburo's decision to intervene in Afghanistan in 1979. It will show that up to the early 1930s, the Soviets were greatly concerned with threats to Soviet domestic security emanating out of Afghanistan. Then, from about 1935, when the Basmachi no longer constituted a serious threat, foreign policy concerns assumed a higher priority. This situation lasted until developments in Afghanistan and abroad in the 1970s again caused worries of threats to Soviet domestic security emanating out of Afghanistan.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

Until 1919, Afghanistan's foreign policy was loosely subordinated to Britain, which was Russia's and the Soviet Union's traditional great power rival in



Fig. 1: King Amanullah of Afghanistan (r. 1926-1929) was born 1892 in Paghman, Afghanistan, and died 1960 in Switzerland.

Central Asia. By the time of the Russian Civil War, Afghanistan was an independent country and thus functioned as a buffer state between Soviet Central Asia and British India. Yet, the Soviets soon noted that independent Afghanistan could be hostile, too, since the Afghan king sent troops and advisors to Muslim insurgents in Soviet Central Asia. Although these reinforcements played no decisive role, it was obvious to Moscow that Afghanistan still might constitute a threat – and that Soviet Muslims easily might side for the Afghan enemy in case of war.

The fear of Muslim revolts was regarded as a matter for domestic security, not foreign intelligence, which wanted to know what the Afghan ruler was up to. Soviet intelligence ran agents in Afghanistan already in the period up to and including the Second World War, for which purpose it established a residency in Afghanistan's capital Kabul. Previously, Soviet intelligence had been represented in Meymaneh, near the border with Soviet Turkmenistan. When a residency was established in or around 1930, it was the Soviet intelligence chief in Meymaneh who was appointed resident. From 1930 to 1934, the residency in Kabul was subordinated to the Soviet security and intelligence service OGPU⁴ in Tashkent. By the early 1930s, there was



Fig. 2: Habibullah Kalakani (seated, left) pictured with his followers in Afghanistan, gave a safe haven for Basmachi fighters.

also a residency in Mazar-e Sharif near the border with Soviet Uzbekistan. From October 1935, the Kabul residency was directly subordinated to the Fifth Department of the GUGB.⁵

The OGPU in Tashkent, and its subordinate residencies in Afghanistan, dealt with Muslim insurgents from a counterinsurgency perspective. Soviet foreign intelligence in Afghanistan primarily concerned itself with political developments in Afghanistan as well as work against the activities of the British, Japanese, and in time, German intelligence services in Afghanistan.⁶ Yet, from a counterinsurgency perspective, the Afghan support to Basmachi gangs was a particular concern. In 1925, Soviet OGPU units retaliated by seizing Urta-Tagay, an island in the Amu Darya on the border with Afghanistan that had become a Basmachi base. The OGPU units remained until August 1926, when a treaty of neutrality and mutual nonaggression was signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Moscow had by then ceded its claims to Urta-Tagay).⁷

OGPU would soon again have to deal with Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan. One source of information to the Soviets may have been Afghanistan's future king, Muhammad Nadir Khan (1883-1933), who Soviet intelligence claimed had been "drinking vodka with the chekists⁸ of the Kabul trade representative's office". The chronology for this claim remains unclear, since Nadir Khan spent the latter half of the 1920s in Paris. However, following Afghan King Amanullah's forced abdication in January 1929 in response to a rebellion, Nadir Khan reportedly entered into an agreement with the Soviets, through the OGPU chairman Vyacheslav Menzhinskiy (1874-1934) and the head of INO OGPU⁹ Mikhail Trilisser (1883-1940), that the Soviets would send military support against the rebels. As a result, in April 1929 a former Cossack commander named Vitaliy Primakov (1897-1937) led a primarily Soviet expeditionary force into Afghanistan. Ostensibly subordinated to the Afghan ambassador to Moscow, Ghulam Nabi (died 1932), the Soviet-Afghan force captured Mazar-e Sharif and other places in northern Afghanistan. However, they failed to gain popular support, and Moscow recalled the force, which returned in June 1929.¹⁰

The threat to Soviet power from Muslim insurgents was not yet over. In spring 1930, Moscow again sent OGPU units into Afghanistan, this time

to a distance of a hundred kilometers. Their target was the Basmachi group of Ibrahim Bek (1889-1931). Moscow only recalled the force when Nadir Khan, having succeeded Amanullah as king under the name Nadir Shah, went to Moscow, where he signed a treaty of mutual friendship and nonaggression in June 1931.¹¹ The Basmachi group of Ibrahim Bek was subsequently destroyed through a plan hatched by the Soviet residency at Mazar-e Sharif. In 1931, Ibrahim Bek was enticed to leave Afghanistan for Soviet Tajikistan where he was cornered and killed by OGPU units.¹²

From 1935 onwards, the Kabul residency handled foreign intelligence. As noted, the key interest of Soviet foreign intelligence in Afghanistan was political developments and the activities of foreign powers. For instance, the official history of the Russian foreign intelligence service describes how one such informer, a beautiful and talented lady of Polish origin known as Maryam who was active from 1935 onwards, was a key source of information on activities and opinions within the Afghan government. Having lost her first husband already during the Russian Civil War, she began to work for Soviet intelligence in Tashkent. She married an Afghan diplomat, Azizurrahman Fathi, which enabled her to report on Afghan activities in Tashkent, then followed her new husband to Kabul when he returned home. It turned out that Azizurrahman Fathi's brother was Ali Muhammad (c. 1893-1977), who served as Afghanistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs in the period 1939-1952. Ali Muhammad too fancied Maryam, and when Azizurrahman Fathi died "under unclear circumstances" (as the Soviet official history put it), Maryam became Ali Muhammad's unofficial wife. Ali Muhammad subsequently became a deputy prime minister and, in 1963, Minister of Court under King Zahir Shah (1914-2007, r. 1933-1973). This position gave him considerable influence in Kabul. Besides, Zahir Shah liked Maryam's Russian cooking. Maryam was also an obstetrician, and she was in this capacity consulted by Zahir Shah's wife. Maryam remained an active and useful source for Soviet intelligence at least into the 1960s. Ali Muhammad's service as Minister of Court ended in 1973, when Zahir Shah was ousted in a coup, led by Muhammad Daud who abolished the monarchy and made Afghanistan a republic and a one-party state.¹³




Fig. 3: Muhammad Daud abolished the monarchy and proclaimed himself president.

Daud's coup came as no surprise to the Soviets. The KGB also had informers among Afghan leftists. These included Nur Muhammad Taraki (1917-1979), the Marxist leader of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), who with other Afghan informers had provided intelligence on Daud's plans.¹⁴ Another source was known as Salih, who served Soviet intelligence for 42 years. During this time, Salih worked in various capacities within the Afghan Foreign Ministry, including as head of the cipher section. Salih eventually recruited three informers and handed them over to the residency.¹⁵

The same pattern of Soviet foreign intelligence activities continued throughout the Cold War, during which Afghanistan retained its role as a buffer state. Soviet foreign intelligence focused on Afghan politics and the activities of foreign intelligence services. In the mid-1950s, Soviet military intelligence reportedly sent a group of 56 agents from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into Afghanistan, with orders to carry out operations against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan in case of war. However, two of them turned themselves in, and the attempt failed.¹⁶ Soviet intelligence personnel in Afghanistan were also the focus of foreign intelligence services, including those of the People's Republic of China.¹⁷

Meanwhile, the Soviets were successful in improving relations with Afghanistan. Their major means of influence was the distribution of foreign aid. The Soviets also provided military equipment and training to the Afghan government. Following Muhammad Daud's coup, the close relationship with the Soviet Union deepened further. As in the past, during the periods of British and Russian jockeying for influence in the country, the close relationship largely consisted of the provision of generous foreign aid.

THE SAUR REVOLUTION

The Daud government lasted for only five years. Ambitious but insufficiently ruthless, Daud possibly began to believe in his own republican rhetoric and thought that a one-party state provided sufficient security from rivals. On 27 April 1978, a coup by leftist military officers of the PDPA under Taraki brought the PDPA to power, overthrowing and murdering Daud and all members of his family, either during the coup or immediately afterwards.¹⁸ The name of the country was changed to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The PDPA radicals regarded their action as emerging from within the Marxist-Leninist tradition and being on a par with the Russian October Revolution. The PDPA accordingly referred to the coup as the Saur Revolution, after the Afghan lunar month of this name. Taraki took power with Hafizullah Amin (1929-1979) as his trusted deputy.

Taraki had a chequered career in business, journalism, and fiction writing, and even included, in 1953, a brief assignment as press attaché in Washington, DC. He was also a Marxist who firmly believed in the cause. He spoke limited English and no Russian. Taraki's protégé Amin, who eventually turned against his mentor and killed him, was more cosmopolitan in outlook. Amin had studied at Kabul University and Columbia University in New York and had also worked as a teacher.¹⁹ While at Columbia, he had some contacts with the CIA. Not denying the contacts, Amin later claimed that he had been short of money and merely played the CIA for what it was worth, yet both Afghans and Soviets later worried about these links.²⁰ Amin was fluent in English but spoke no Russian.²¹ A third key PDPA leader was Babrak Karmal (1929-1996), who had studied law and played a prominent part



© nacionalmarxista

Fig. 4: Nur Muhammad Taraki, the second president of Afghanistan.

in student politics. A Soviet intelligence report later described him as "emotional, inclined to abstraction to the detriment of concrete analysis. He has little knowledge of or interest in economic matters. He speaks English fluently and knows some German."²²

Both Taraki and Karmal were recruited by Soviet intelligence in the 1950s.²³ Taraki reported to the Soviet intelligence service KGB that his rival Karmal worked for the Afghan security service and for West German intelligence. Karmal reported to the KGB that Taraki worked for American and British intelligence.²⁴ Both had their respective followers within the PDPA, known as the Khalq and Parcham factions, respectively. The Soviets spent years attempting to reconcile the two respective groups of Marxists, without ever succeeding. The PDPA and its newspaper were financed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee.²⁵ It was a party of city intellectuals. In 1978, only 5 percent of the membership consisted of workers and peasants.²⁶

There is no evidence that the Soviet KGB was behind the Saur Revolution, despite rumors to this effect, which may have emerged since it was KGB personnel – not the Soviet ambassador or chief military advisor – who retained contacts with the

PDPA during the time of the Daud government.²⁷ Apparently, the KGB only learnt of the planned coup immediately before it took place, having indeed been instructed by Moscow in 1974 to inform Taraki and his second-in-command Amin that they should cooperate with the Daud government.²⁸ Nonetheless, since the Soviets could not prevent the coup, found it hard to abandon fellow Marxists, and in any case did not wish to abandon their substantial investments in the country, Soviet foreign aid continued.

The Afghan Marxists adhered to Stalinist and revolutionary policies long since abandoned in the Soviet Union itself. Problems emerged immediately, despite the best intentions of the revolutionaries. The PDPA had little support outside the major cities and had no roots in Afghan rural society. In effect, it was a segment of the urban minority that came to power under the name of the PDPA. This population segment regarded the traditional, conservative, and rural culture as standing in the way of necessary reforms. Moreover, they held it in contempt. As a result, the PDPA leaders set about a social revolution. On 9 May 1978, only a few days after the revolution, the PDPA unveiled a radical program of social, political, and economic reform. Following Lenin's example, the PDPA leaders aimed to sweep away institutional barriers to Afghanistan's transition into a modern, socialist society. For them, Soviet Central Asia was a very real example of what a modernized Afghanistan would look like. And reform seemed to be within reach, since the Soviets had achieved what the Afghans had failed to accomplish.

However, the reform program was soon met with violence. The PDPA government's literacy campaign caused an immediate reaction. Confronted with secular teachers and textbooks with Marxist content, most village mullahs reacted negatively. Many incited the villagers into murdering the teachers. Then there was the land reform. From 1978 onwards, the size of personal landholdings was limited by decree, and land above the limit was confiscated without compensation. The PDPA leadership hoped, mistakenly, that land reform would appeal to the rural poor who made up the majority of the population, but, again, many village mullahs reacted negatively. This caused widespread resistance to the reform even among those who were supposed to benefit. Even those who might have

profited from the land reform often felt unable to take advantage, since they were bound with the landowners through a web of social relations. The damage to the rural economy provoked extreme hostility to the Kabul government among the rural poor who were most seriously affected by the inept policies, encouraging them to join the emerging insurgency.²⁹ In effect, the PDPA's ideological zeal blinded it to the nuts and bolts requirements of good governance. For these various reasons, the reform program caused significant resentment in rural areas, and as early as November 1978, U.S. intelligence reported that fighting was escalating in the provinces, and that the insurgents were receiving arms and support from Pashtun organizations operating from Pakistan.³⁰

Believing in their own revolutionary righteousness, the PDPA leaders were more eager to purge their own ranks in vicious infighting for power than to lead the country. Soon after the 1978 coup, members of the Khalq faction of the PDPA began to purge those of the Parcham faction. The infighting began with Taraki, not with Amin who continued this policy and later received most of the blame, but the latter certainly accelerated the intra-party tensions as he steadily increased his influence within the Taraki government. Appointed deputy head of government after the Saur Revolution in April 1978, Amin in April 1979 became chairman of the Council of Ministers, that is, prime minister and head of government.

When KGB informers came to power, such as happened in Afghanistan, the KGB had to change the nature of its relationship with the informer. The latter would then cease his previous activities, instead becoming what the KGB referred to as a trusted contact or, in case of a head of state or government, special unofficial contact. Henceforth, Taraki and the others continued to provide assistance to the Soviet Union, but they did so within limits chosen by them, not the KGB.³¹ A formal KGB connection was eventually established. The Taraki government requested KGB support from the Soviet Union on 8 May 1978, and a KGB representative office was established in Kabul on 30 June 1978. Its first head, KGB Colonel Leonid Bogdanov, arrived on 2 August. The representative office remained until early 1992.³²

There had been a previous Afghan intelligence and security service, known merely as Istikhbarat

(“intelligence”).³³ By the 1970s, it was extremely ineffective and not much trusted by the Afghan leaders who relied more on personal connections.³⁴ However, because of the coup that brought the PDPA into power, and the vastly increased degree of repression introduced to keep the new government in power, a new organization was needed. For this reason, Taraki with the help of the Soviets in September 1978 established a security service named AGSA, led by Asadullah Sarwari.³⁵ Following the 1979 coup d'état by Amin, which will be described shortly, Amin changed the name of the security service to KAM. It was led in short succession by Sarwari's cousin Aziz Ahmad Akbari and Amin's cousin Asadullah Amin.³⁶ Both AGSA and KAM primarily engaged in the arrest, torture, and extrajudicial execution of those perceived to be enemies of the PDPA government. The AGSA and the KAM were subordinated to the Minister of the Interior.³⁷



Fig. 5: Asadullah Sarwari, an Afghan politician, who was appointed head of the Afghan Security Service.

TARAKI REQUESTS SOVIET INTERVENTION

In March 1979, a violent uprising took place in the Afghan city of Herat. At the time of the Herat Uprising, Taraki immediately appealed to the Soviet government for help in the form of military equipment, ammunition, and rations. He also asked for support from Soviet ground and air forces to put down the rebellion and prevent government collapse. Amin, too, asked for Soviet troops. As a result of the repeated demands, the Soviet Politburo met to discuss the situation in Afghanistan on 17, 18, and 19 March 1979. Transcripts from the meeting show that the Soviet leaders did not have a cavalier attitude to military intervention

in Afghanistan, even though the option remained on the table. The tasks of a General Staff include the constant preparation and reassessment of plans for this or that strategic contingency, and the Soviet Union was no different. During the meeting, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov (1908-1984) reported that contingency plans for intervention had been prepared.³⁸

To lose Afghanistan was unacceptable. Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko (1909-1989) summarized the thinking of the Soviet leadership: “For 60 years now we have lived with Afghanistan in peace and friendship. And if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns against the Soviet Union, this will result in a sharp setback to our foreign policy.” Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin (1904-1980) agreed: “We must put up a struggle for Afghanistan; after all, we have lived side by side for 60 years.” However, while the Politburo was unwilling to lose Afghanistan, the Soviet leaders were already disillusioned with the Taraki government. First, they were exasperated with the Afghan government and its excesses, in the form of destructive party infighting and botched reforms, and understood that both Taraki and Amin had lied to them. Kosygin was particularly blunt in his assessment: “Amin and Taraki alike are concealing from us the true state of affairs. We still don't know exactly what is happening in Afghanistan.” Second, the Soviet leaders realized that Taraki and Amin had created their predicament through their own inept policies and poorly conceived reforms, essentially ruining whatever support they otherwise might have gained in the country. Kosygin argued that, “we must speak to Taraki and Amin about the mistakes that they have permitted to occur during this time. In reality, even up to the present time, they have continued to execute people that do not agree with them; they have killed almost all of the leaders – not only the top leaders, but also those of the middle ranks – of the ‘Parcham’ party.”³⁹

Andrey Kirilenko (1906-1990), Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, agreed: “Taraki must be instructed to change his tactics. Executions, torture and so forth cannot be applied on a massive scale. Religious questions, the relationship with religious communities, with religion generally and with religious leaders take on special meaning for them. This is a major policy issue. And here Taraki must ensure, with all deci-

siveness, that no illicit measures whatsoever are undertaken by them.”⁴⁰ The Soviet leaders were also very aware of the risks inherent in sending troops to Afghanistan, both from a practical and legal perspective. They did not wish to fight the entire Afghan people to prop up the incompetent PDPA government. Kirilenko asked, rhetorically, “whom will our troops be fighting against if we send them there[?] Against the insurgents? Or have they been joined by a large number of religious fundamentalists, that is, Muslims, and among them large numbers of ordinary people? Thus, we will be required to wage war in significant part against the people.”⁴¹

KGB chairman Yuriy Andropov (1914-1984) agreed, with an emphasis on the nature of the insurgents: “Our operational data tells us that about three thousand insurgents are being directed into Afghanistan from Pakistan. These are, in main part, religious fanatics from among the people.” For this reason, he argued that the PDPA revolution should not be supported with Soviet troops, making it clear that “we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and that is for us entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk.” Andropov explained: “To deploy our troops would mean to wage war against the people, to crush the people, to shoot at the people. We will look like aggressors, and we cannot permit that to occur.” Gro-




Fig. 6: Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs (1957-1985), Andrey Gromyko in 1972.

myko too concluded that if the Soviet army entered Afghanistan, it would be portrayed as an aggressor and would have to fight the entire Afghan people. Besides, there had been no foreign aggression, he noted, merely an internal struggle: “I completely support Comrade Andropov’s proposal to rule out such a measure as the deployment of our troops into Afghanistan. The army there is unreliable. Thus, our army, when it arrives in Afghanistan, will be the aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the Afghan people first of all, and it will have to shoot at them.”⁴²

Gromyko continued by concluding that “we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view too we would not be justified in sending troops. According to the UN Charter, a country can appeal for assistance, and we could send troops, in case it is subject to external aggression. Afghanistan has not been subject to any aggression. This is its internal affair, a revolutionary internal conflict, a battle of one group of the population against another.”⁴³

As result, the Politburo decided to send increased foreign aid, substantial military supplies, and additional advisors from the ministry of defense and the KGB, but no Soviet troops.⁴⁴ By the end of the discussions, Kirilenko summarized his feelings with regard to the situation created by Taraki and Amin: “The government of Afghanistan itself has done nothing to secure the situation. And it has a hundred thousand man army at that. What has it done? What good has it accomplished? Essentially nothing. And after all, Comrades, we gave very, very good support to Afghanistan [...] We gave it everything. And what has come of it? It has come to nothing of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people for no reason and even spoke to us of their own justification. [...] So you see what kind of Marxists we have found.”⁴⁵

While the Politburo transcripts make abundantly clear Moscow’s exasperation with the PDPA government, and Moscow’s unwillingness to intervene militarily, why then were Kosygin and Gromyko so adamant that having lived in peace with Afghanistan for 60 years, the Soviet Union would have to put up a struggle for the country? The transcripts do not explain their thinking and, since all participants in the meeting have passed away without leaving memoirs, there can be no certain answer. For the context in which they had gained an understanding and formed their opinions of Afghanistan, we must

search for clues elsewhere, in particular in the by-then-common knowledge of Soviet relations with Afghanistan. It has already been described how in the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet troops intervened several times in Afghanistan, which in those years indeed was regarded as a dangerous source of Pan-Islamic beliefs. As noted, it was also known that in the early years of his reign, Afghan King Amanullah had funneled some support to Basmachi in Soviet Central Asia, an insurgency that threatened the very cohesion of the Central Asian parts of the Soviet Union and took years to extinguish. As senior CPSU members who were old enough to have been involved in politics in those days, both Kosygin and Gromyko can be expected to have had at least some knowledge of these events, if only from hearsay. Moreover, Afghanistan as a neighboring country was a reality for the Soviet leadership to a far higher degree than it was for most other countries, including those in the West. The Soviet school system had a centrally planned curriculum, and the standard history textbook included information on Soviet relations with Afghanistan. The Basmachi Revolt, for instance, was described in some detail, including its support from (unnamed) imperialist countries. The treaty of friendship and neutrality with Afghanistan and Nadir Shah's 1931 treaty of mutual friendship and nonaggression were

also mentioned as means through which the Soviet government had disrupted a united anti-Soviet front among the capitalist countries.⁴⁶ It follows that in the eyes of the Politburo, peaceful relations with Afghanistan were not a mere ideological posture but a genuine security prerequisite. The squabbles in Kabul directly affected Soviet security. If Moscow lost influence in Afghanistan, the Soviets would eventually have to face armed Muslim extremists in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan; of this, the Soviet leaders were certain.

Kabul restored a measure of control in Herat after about a week. For Moscow, this made the Afghan question less urgent, but the problem did not go away. On 1 April 1979, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and a Politburo candidate member, submitted a policy document in which they analyzed the situation in Afghanistan. The document was discussed in the Politburo on 12 April. The Soviet leaders concluded that the reasons for the recent sharp deterioration in the situation in Afghanistan included complex inter-ethnic and tribal controversies, religious fanaticism, extreme nationalism, economic hardships, and the consolidation of all opposition ("counter-revolutionary") forces. The PDPA program of social and economic transformation was in



© Виктор Рыжов (Viktor Ryzhov)

Fig. 7: A group of Soviet Special Forces soldiers of the GRU.

the very beginning of its implementation, and most of the population had not experienced for themselves the advantages of the new order and therefore did not appreciate its progressive character. Moreover, the Politburo saw the Afghan leadership as inexperienced, overzealous, insufficiently flexible, and unwilling to listen to Soviet advice. Their socialist reforms had not been thought through and had backfired. They would need to allow religious freedom and work with the Muslim clergy, except those who opposed the government – whose influence instead should be divided and undermined. However, the PDPA should observe the rule of law even when suppressing subversion. While the Soviet Union would continue to deliver military weapons and supplies and provide training, no Soviet military units would be sent to Afghanistan.⁴⁷

Even so, the Soviet General Staff continued its task of contingency planning for a possible intervention, and some concrete preparations were undertaken. In May 1979, the Soviet military intelligence service, GRU, began to set up a special airborne battalion that consisted of Soviet soldiers of Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen ethnic background. This Muslim Battalion consisted of some 500 men and was provided with a special uniform that looked like those of the Afghan army and showed no Soviet markings.⁴⁸ Then, following a Politburo meeting on 29 June, a regular Soviet airborne battalion in July deployed from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan's Bagram Airport, together with a detachment of KGB special forces.⁴⁹

AMIN'S COUP

By the end of summer, Moscow had all but given up hope on the Taraki and Amin government's ability to lead Afghanistan. Ever since the Herat Uprising, the Soviets had advised Taraki and Amin to broaden their government's political and social base by putting an end to intra-party purges, unpopular land reform, and a host of other initiatives introduced by the PDPA in order to bring about socialism overnight. On 1 September 1979, the KGB submitted a report on the situation in Afghanistan, which concluded that Taraki and Amin ignored the advice from Soviet representatives. Both, but in particular Amin, thought that military force and terror would resolve the many problems engendered by their failed political and social policies.

The report suggested that since Amin was the driving force behind the failed policy, a way should be found to remove him from power. Taraki should then be persuaded to form an ostensibly democratic coalition government, still with the PDPA in the leading role but with representation also from patriotic clergy, national minorities, and the intelligentsia so as to give a progressive face to proceedings. Finally, Babrak Karmal, who previously had gone into exile, should be brought into the planning process for an alternative PDPA government, should one become required.⁵⁰

In plain language, the KGB advised the removal of the dangerous and incompetent Amin and the putting into place of a government that would be loyal to Moscow, display a minimum level of competence, and show a democratic face so as to look acceptable to both the domestic Afghan opposition and at least those foreign states that were not too anti-Soviet in their policies. Essentially, the KGB advised that Afghanistan be included in the application of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had been introduced after the Soviet-forced regime change in Czechoslovakia eleven years earlier and was meant to safeguard the cohesiveness of the Eastern Bloc under Soviet leadership.

On 10 September, CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (1906-1982) met Taraki in Moscow, warning him that it was dangerous to permit the concentration of excessive power in the hands of people such as Amin.⁵¹ Whether Taraki failed to understand or merely chose to ignore Brezhnev's advice, he sealed his fate by not acting on the Soviet warning. Following a period of escalating tensions that involved the attempted assassinations of key PDPA officials by their intra-party rivals, Amin on 16 September 1979 deposed Taraki in a coup and assumed sole power.⁵² Amin subsequently had Taraki murdered, together with hundreds of other PDPA members who were killed under Amin's rule. The post-coup killings presided over by Amin were only the culmination of the intra-PDPA purges that had followed the PDPA assumption of power. In total, an estimated 10,000 PDPA members may have been killed in 1978-1979; however, records either did not survive or were not kept, so there is no way of knowing for sure.⁵³

The Soviet leadership was unhappy with Amin's excesses. In a highly confidential statement on 1 October 1979 (written before the Soviet lead-

ership knew of Taraki's murder) the CPSU central committee explained that "one cannot be uncritical of many of Amin's methods and activities, in particular his extreme lust for power, ruthlessness in his relations with former colleagues, forming opinions and making decisions singlehandedly."⁵⁴

SOVIET DECISION TO INTERVENE

The Soviet leaders had many reasons to be upset about Amin, including one that was personal. Brezhnev had promised Taraki protection and, after Amin's coup, the Soviets had asked Amin to spare Taraki's life. Amin chose not to listen. This upset Brezhnev greatly, and the murder of Taraki became the immediate trigger for intervention.⁵⁵ But there were other reasons as well. Amin had suddenly taken all state power into his own hands, and his implementation of the party's social, political, and economic reform was, if possible, yet more radical than before. Even within the PDPA, opposition to his policies grew so rapidly that the future of Afghanistan's Marxist government appeared to be at

stake. There was also the risk of losing Afghanistan to the West. The KGB reported that Amin was turning toward the Americans. On 27 September, Amin met Bruce Amstutz, the senior U.S. diplomat in the country, suggesting an improvement in relations. The Soviets had counted five such meetings with Amstutz since February 1979. Similar overtures were made by other of Amin's officials as well. Moreover, Amin's supporters began openly to accuse the Soviet Union of plotting against Amin.⁵⁶ Earlier intelligence reports that Amin had been in contact with the CIA while in the United States in the 1960s were now accorded a new importance, interpreted by some as evidence that Amin might have been recruited by the CIA at the time.

In early December 1979, Andropov wrote a personal memorandum to Brezhnev in which he summarized the KGB's take on the many problems with Amin's government: "After the coup and the murder of Taraki in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan began to undertake an undesirable turn for us. The situation in the party, the army and the government apparatus has become



Fig. 8: Afghanistan's topography shows many different zones, with deserts in the south and glaciers in the north. The difference in altitude between lowest and highest point is more than 7,000 m.

© User: Sommerkom

more acute, as they were essentially destroyed as a result of the mass repressions carried out by Amin. At the same time, alarming information started to arrive about Amin's secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West. [These included:] Contacts with an American agent about issues which are kept secret from us. Promises to tribal leaders to shift away from USSR and to adopt a 'policy of neutrality.' Closed meetings in which attacks were made against Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists. The practical removal of our headquarters in Kabul, etc. The diplomatic circles in Kabul are widely talking of Amin's differences with Moscow and his possible anti-Soviet steps."⁵⁷ Andropov also concluded that "right now there is no guarantee that Amin, in order to protect his personal power, will not shift to the West."⁵⁸ To the old fear of Afghanistan becoming the origin of a Muslim threat to Soviet Central Asia was now added the fear that Moscow might lose Afghanistan to the Western alliance.

The KGB had already begun to prepare a contingency plan for the removal of Amin from power. It was probably believed that any such plan, as well as plans for a variety of other contingencies, could be supported by Soviet forces already in place in Afghanistan. In addition to the airborne battalion deployed in July, the Soviet Muslim Battalion and additional KGB special forces had been sent to Bagram on 9 November.⁵⁹ On 4 December, KGB General Vadim Kirpichenko was sent to Kabul to plan for this contingency, and by 11 December, he and his men had drawn up a preliminary plan for a military coup against Amin.⁶⁰ There was not yet any formal decision, however, and when Kirpichenko arrived in Kabul with orders to mount a coup, he understood that neither the Soviet ambassador nor the GRU resident had been told about the plan.⁶¹

On 8 December 1979, Brezhnev met with leading members of the Politburo, including Andropov, Gromyko, and Ustinov. Notably, it was not the full Politburo which met. Formally, the full Politburo retained its centrality in Soviet policy-making. Yet, the events suggest that it was its key members who dominated the foreign-policy process. While no transcript of the meeting seems to have survived, they reportedly discussed the situation in and around Afghanistan. Andropov and Ustinov listed the reasons for a military intervention, including CIA activities which they interpreted as

efforts to create a "new Great Ottoman Empire" that would include the southern republics of the Soviet Union; the inadequacy of Soviet air defense systems in the southern union republics including around the space center in Baikonur, which meant that any deployment of U.S. missiles in Afghanistan, following an Afghan turn to the West, would threaten vital objects; the risk that the Afghan uranium deposits could be used by Pakistan and Iraq to build nuclear weapons; the prospects for opposition bases in northern Afghanistan and annexation of that region by Pakistan; and so on. If Afghanistan turned to the West, the country would no longer function as a buffer on the southern border. It was also worrying that anti-Soviet sentiments were growing in Afghanistan. The threats were manifold and, in the end, the Politburo decided to work on two options: (1) to remove Amin from power and replace him with Karmal; and (2) to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan to ensure the forthcoming succession.⁶²

Four days later, on 12 December, the Politburo, including Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, and Ustinov, met again. They decided to intervene and remove Amin, but also to support the PDPA government and destroy the insurgency.⁶³ The decision was, as far as is known, only documented in a handwritten resolution.⁶⁴ It is quite possible that the handwritten document was merely the formal process of demonstrating that the Politburo stood united behind its collective decision, even though the decision probably had already been taken on 8 December.

Andropov's arguments about the possibility that Amin was turning to the West were not quite as paranoid and unfounded as later observers might wish to believe. In February 1979, Khomeini's Islamic revolution in Iran had deprived the West of a staunch ally in the region, and in November, American diplomats had been taken hostage in Tehran. The United States had also lost its signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities in Iran, and the CIA had in spring 1979 considered the possibility of establishing replacement facilities in Afghanistan.⁶⁵ On 3 July 1979, President Jimmy Carter (born 1924, president 1977-1981) in a secret presidential finding ordered the provision of clandestine aid (cash, radios, medical supplies) to Islamic extremist opponents of the pro-Soviet Afghan government. On the very same day, Carter's National Security Ad-

viser, Zbigniew Brzezinski (born 1928; national security adviser 1977-1981), wrote a note to the president in which he explained that, in his view, the aid would lead to military intervention by the Soviets. According to Brzezinski's own statement several years later, his intention was to draw the Soviets into their own Vietnam war.⁶⁶ This is in part borne out by a memorandum that Brzezinski wrote for the president on 26 December 1979, in which he discussed the recent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and what could be done to turn Afghanistan into a Soviet Vietnam.⁶⁷ If it is correct that Soviet intelligence immediately had learned about the beginning of the provision of American clandestine aid to Islamic extremist groups in Pakistan in the summer of 1979, as per President Carter's secret decision, this too might have influenced the decision (although the transcripts do not mention this as being part of the discussion).⁶⁸ Besides, contingency planning for worst-case scenarios formed an integral part of the Cold War, and the two sides did constantly plot against each other. It would have been naïve for Moscow to assume that the West was uninterested in taking advantage of the unrest in Afghanistan. Besides, détente was unraveling and the United States was developing new strategic weapons systems that would undermine the principle of strategic parity that for a while had stabilized relations between the superpowers. As for the suspicion that Amin was on the CIA payroll, this has subsequently been denied, but such an allegation was hard to prove or disprove under the conditions of Cold War.⁶⁹

Besides, the issue was not as simple as Amin being on the CIA payroll or not. The KGB worried that Amin would follow Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's lead. Sadat had in 1972, in a sudden policy shift that took the world by surprise, downgraded his relations with the Soviet Union and made a turn to the United States. The Western world interpreted Sadat's move as the expulsion of his Soviet advisers and described the policy shift as "probably the most severe defeat the Soviet Union has suffered since it began to buy friends and influence nations in the non-Communist Third World."⁷⁰ Although the actual rift between Egypt and the Soviet Union only appears to have taken place after the Arab-Israeli October War of 1973,⁷¹ a similar policy shift seemed to be a real possibility in Afghanistan as well. In addition to contacts with Americans, the

Kabul KGB residency reported, possibly inaccurately, that Amin's envoys at the end of September had met the "extreme Muslim opposition" during which the possibility of expelling the Soviets, releasing imprisoned Muslim insurgents, and ending the civil wars had been discussed. The Soviets also contemplated the prospect of an Afghanistan-Iran rapprochement, with the accompanying establishment of a truly radical Islamic state in Afghanistan.⁷² Or possibly, since it was too early for the Soviets to know what impact, if any, Khomeini's Islamic revolution might have, an anti-Soviet coalition between Iran and the People's Republic of China and the latter's protégé Pakistan.⁷³

The Americans were not the only threat. KGB officers in Afghanistan had reported that the West German intelligence service, the BND, was active in and around Afghanistan.⁷⁴ Before he was overthrown and killed, Taraki too had reported about West German intelligence activities, as well as similar activities by the United States, the People's Republic of China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.⁷⁵ West German specialists had indeed been involved in Afghanistan. By the time of the Daud government, Bonn had, for instance, provided ten West German police advisors and technical support to the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.⁷⁶ These were replaced by Soviet and Warsaw Pact advisers in 1979.⁷⁷ Amin, too, compounded the worries that West German intelligence was operating in Afghanistan, since he had denounced his rival Karmal as an agent of either the United States or West Germany.⁷⁸

Besides, it is factually correct that American intelligence had considered the potential of Islam as a possible rallying point against Soviet rule. Foremost among CIA officers who supported this view was Paul B. Henze (1924-2011), the CIA station chief in Ankara, Turkey, from 1974 to 1977. From 1977 to 1980, Henze worked with Zbigniew Brzezinski in the U.S. National Security Council. There he chaired the Nationalities Working Group, an interagency task force that focused on the non-Russian regions of the Soviet Union.⁷⁹

This worried the Soviets, possibly more so than the Americans had expected. In December 1980, at a meeting to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Azerbaijan SSR's KGB as well as in an article published in the newspaper *Bakinskiy rabochiy*, then-First Secretary of the republic Heydar Aliyev (1923-2003), a candidate member of the Soviet



Fig. 9: Hafizullah Amin, the Afghan dictator, was supposed to be removed on the first day of the Soviet intervention.

Politburo and former head of the republic's KGB, spelled out the threat. "In connection with the situation in Iran and Afghanistan, the US special services are trying to use the Islamic religion as one of the factors in influencing the political situation in our country, especially in places with a Muslim population."⁸⁰

SOVIET INTERVENTION

Since the Herat Uprising of March 1979, both Taraki and Amin had repeatedly asked for Soviet military intervention.⁸¹ Following the murder of Taraki, Moscow was ready to respond. On 14 December, a military operational group was established in Termez, in Soviet Uzbekistan near the Afghan border. The group set up a new army, the 40th, which would deploy in Afghanistan as the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan.⁸² Airborne forces began to be airlifted into Kabul and Bagram airports on the night between 24 and 25 December.⁸³ On 25 December, the Soviet 40th Army received its marching orders, and entered Afghanistan from Soviet Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan within a few hours.⁸⁴ The intervention was justified by the multi-

ple requests for military intervention by the Taraki and Amin governments and by being in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978.⁸⁵

The plan was to remove Amin on the first day of the intervention. However, the coup, formally designated Operation Agat (Agate) but afterwards more often referred to as Operation Shtorm-333 (Storm-333) from the code word that was used in radio communications to initiate the action, had to be postponed for two days due to the complexity in pinpointing Amin's whereabouts and current security precautions while making sure that Afghan units loyal to Amin would not be in a position to interfere either at Amin's palace or the other facilities that had to be taken (ministries, army headquarters, communications centers, and so on). On 27 December 1979, preparations were completed and the circumstances appeared as auspicious as could be. Soviet KGB special forces, the Muslim Battalion, and airborne troops stormed Amin's Taj Bek palace, fighting their way toward the private residence in a desperate battle with Amin's well-armed Presidential Guard. Amin was killed during the assault, possibly deliberately by one of the few Parcham loyalists who were brought along to take part in the action, possibly by accident.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, the KGB had flown in Karmal, who waited at Bagram under KGB protection. On the evening of 27 December, before the assault on the palace had been concluded, Andropov informed Karmal that he had been appointed chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The next morning, Karmal was moved into Kabul, protected by bodyguards from the KGB Ninth Directorate (responsible for the physical protection of members of the Politburo).⁸⁷ KGB personal security specialists henceforth had to protect the Afghan leadership, and were brought in from Moscow as needed.⁸⁸

It was a regime change imposed from abroad. Amin had been a turbulent and vicious dictator and, as has been shown, the Soviet leaders could no longer stomach his excesses. Even so, the Soviet coup did not prevent continued unrest in Afghanistan. The first rural resistance was localized, decentralized, and largely spontaneous. Clergy would exhort the community to violence, then a mass uprising would occur, generally focusing on an attack on a government post. However, the violence stayed

localized, since members of the community would not attempt to go beyond their own territory.⁸⁹ In effect, this was the traditional pattern of uprisings, the type encountered by the early Afghan monarchs. But this also meant that there was no center of resistance which could easily be defeated by a numerically stronger or technologically superior military force.

WESTERN RESPONSE

It was not only for Brezhnev that personal feelings caused by Amin's betrayal of Taraki and indeed Brezhnev himself affected how he reacted in Afghanistan. On the other side of the Atlantic, President Carter too felt betrayed. Notwithstanding the fact that he had ordered the provision of clandestine aid to the Islamic extremist groups (the aforementioned cash, radios, and medical supplies) soon after meeting with Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979, he felt that he had achieved a rapport and understanding with Brezhnev during their summit. Carter spoke of "continuing cooperation and honesty in our discussions", and after the meeting, he reported to Congress that "President Brezhnev and I developed a better sense of each other as leaders and as men." For this reason, Carter too felt personally betrayed, by the subsequent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Carter interpreted the Soviet justification, a request by the Afghan government, as a false claim and an insult to his intelligence.⁹⁰ Carter wrote in his diary: "the Soviet invasion sent a clear indication that they were not to be trusted."⁹¹

In contrast, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance argued that "the primary motive for the Soviet actions was defensive, that the Soviets do not have long-term regional ambitions beyond Afghanistan."⁹² Meanwhile, national security adviser Brzezinski, as noted, on 26 December wrote his memorandum for the president, in which he discussed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and what could be done to turn Afghanistan into a Soviet Vietnam.⁹³ While it is fair to conclude that Brzezinski's view came to dominate U.S. policy, Vance was not alone. A veteran observer of Soviet affairs, Raymond L. Garthoff, a former CIA analyst who until 1979 served as a senior Foreign Service inspector, produced the best early analysis of the Soviet take on Afghanistan, and he agreed with Vance.⁹⁴ In late December 1979, Carter signed an amended presidential find-

ing that permitted the CIA to deliver weapons to the extremists, and the first CIA-procured weapons to the Afghan Islamic extremist groups arrived by way of the Pakistanis on 10 January 1980, just two weeks after the Soviet 40th Army had entered Afghanistan.⁹⁵

RESULTS OF 1979

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was primarily a result of the fear that Afghanistan, after it had been won over to the Western alliance, would become a source of Pan-Islamic revolts in Soviet Central Asia. The intervention, which was unpopular with the Soviet military leadership, was a strategy intended to defend existing Soviet territories, not gaining new ones. However, the Soviet intervention degenerated into a series of bloody civil wars, in which Afghan government forces and Soviet troops attempted to eradicate a variety of insurgent groups, many of which derived from the Islamic extremist movement which had emerged in Afghanistan during the 1960s and 1970s. The result became the opposite of what was intended; Soviet forces left Afghanistan in 1989, two years before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Afghan government collapsed a few years later, in 1992. Instead, Islamic extremism steadily grew stronger, since it for years was supported by an informal alliance of countries, chiefly the United States, Britain, France, China, and Pakistan, which responded to the Soviet intervention by activating and supporting an international Islamic jihad against not only the Soviet forces in Afghanistan but against the Afghan government as well. Iran, too, supported insurgents in Afghanistan.⁹⁶

The Soviet leaders had intervened out of fear of perceived future negative consequences, in order to protect their country from attacks by Muslim fanatics. However, the chief result of the intervention was the provision, to the anti-Soviet alliance, of an opportunity to use Muslim extremists as a weapon against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the security consequences were devastating for both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan – and since the late 1990s also for the United States and much of the rest of the world.⁹⁷ The Soviet intervention and the Western response created the ideal opportunity for Islamic extremism and terrorism to establish itself as a major factor in global politics. Moreover,

Islamic extremism established a foothold in the Soviet Union, both in the form of raids from Afghanistan into Soviet Tajikistan from December 1986 onwards and through the reinforcement of existing and propagation of new strands of Islamic extrem-

ism within the Soviet Union itself.⁹⁸ Motivated by the power of fear, the Soviet leaders wanted security, but the psychological urge for safety is an unreliable companion in decision-making, and the results were disastrous.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Alexandre Bennigsen, *The Soviet Union and Muslim Guerrilla Wars, 1920-1981: Lessons for Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA 1981), 1, note 1.
- ² Michael Fredholm, *Hot och hotbilder 1*, in: *Bulletinen 2* (2004), 3-8; id., *Hot och hotbilder 2*, in: *Bulletinen 3* (2004), 1-7. For further details on specifically Afghanistan, see id., *Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of War: Persistent Failure of a Rentier State* (Copenhagen 2018).
- ³ Abraham H. Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, in: *Psychological Review* 50 (1943), 370-396.
- ⁴ OGPU was the acronym for Obyedinennoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye, the name of Soviet intelligence from 1923 to 1934.
- ⁵ Yevgeniy M. Primakov (ed.), *Ocherki istorii rossiysskoy vneshney razvedki*, Vol. 3 (Moscow 2016), 201f. The chapter was written by Major-General L. P. Kostromin, who was deputy head of the KGB representative office in Kabul during the Afghan war. GUGB was the acronym for Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, the name of Soviet intelligence from 1934 to 1941, when it formed part of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, NKVD (Narodnyy Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del).
- ⁶ Primakov, *Ocherki istorii*, 202.
- ⁷ Valeriy V. Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz v Afganistane* (Moscow 2009), 81-84.
- ⁸ The common Russian expression for security service personnel.
- ⁹ INO was the acronym for Inostranny otdel (foreign department), which dealt with foreign intelligence.
- ¹⁰ Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 85f.; Sir Rodric Braithwaite, *Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89* (London 2011), 29; citing A. Lyakhovskiy, *S. Davitaya, Igra v Afganistan* (Moscow 2009), 64; J. Bruce Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation* (Washington 1986), 14, with references.
- ¹¹ Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 87.
- ¹² Primakov, *Ocherki istorii*, 201; William S. Ritter, *The Final Phase in the Liquidation of Anti-Soviet Resistance in Tadzhikistan: Ibrahim Bek and the Basmachi, 1924-31*, in: *Soviet Studies* 37, No. 4 (1985), 484-493; id., *Revolt in the Mountains: Fuzail Maksim and the Occupation of Garm, Spring 1929*, in: *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (1990), 547-580.
- ¹³ Primakov, *Ocherki istorii*, 202f.
- ¹⁴ Vasiliy Mitrokhin, *The KGB in Afghanistan* (Washington 2002), 25. This work was written in 1986-87, based on notes that Mitrokhin copied from the archives of the KGB First Chief Directorate in Yasenevo outside Moscow before he retired in 1984. Mitrokhin claimed that his notes were based exclusively on KGB information and where possible, this seems to be corroborated by other evidence. Mitrokhin's ultimate intention was to defect to the United States or Britain, and the Afghanistan manuscript was his intended ticket out.
- ¹⁵ Primakov, *Ocherki istorii*, 203.
- ¹⁶ Vladimir Snegirev, Valeriy Samunin, *Virus "A": Kak my zaboleti vtorzheniyem v Afganistan* (Rossiyskaya gazeta 2011), 220f. The title translates as "Virus A: How we got infected by the invasion of Afghanistan." Available in English as Vladimir Snegirev, Valeriy Samunin, *The Dead End: The Road to Afghanistan* (Washington 2012), <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu>. Page numbers refer to the English-language edition. Retired KGB colonel Valeriy Samunin arrived in Afghanistan in 1975 and served for more than seven years as a foreign intelligence officer with the Kabul Residency, while historian and journalist Vladimir Snegirev wrote the first investigative stories about the war in Afghanistan published in the Soviet Union (in *Komsomol'skaya pravda* and *Rossiyskaya gazeta*). Samunin described his own experiences in the book under the fictitious name Valeriy Starostin. See, e.g., Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 77.
- ¹⁷ Larisa Kucherova, *KGB v Afganistane* (Moscow 2009), 256f.
- ¹⁸ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (New Haven 1995), 105; Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 41.
- ¹⁹ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 38.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.
- ²¹ Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 422.
- ²² Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 38.
- ²³ Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 19f.; Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World* (London 2005), 386f.
- ²⁴ Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 70.
- ²⁵ Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 22.
- ²⁶ Antonio Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992* (London 2000), 11, 46.
- ²⁷ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 37, 39, 41f. A formal KGB connection was established only later. The Taraki government requested KGB support from the Soviet Union on 8 May 1978, and a KGB representative office was established in Kabul on 30 June 1978. It remained until early 1992. V. S. Khristoforov, *KGB SSSR v Afganistane 1978-1989: K 20-letiyu vyvoda sovetskikh voysk iz Afganistana* (Moscow 2009), 4f., 20.
- ²⁸ Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 7-9, 71f., 108.
- ²⁹ Paul Robinson, Jay Dixon, *Aiding Afghanistan: A History of Soviet Assistance to a Developing Country* (London 2013), 94f., 119.

- ³⁰ Director of Central Intelligence, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Implications for Warning Interagency*. Intelligence Memorandum, October 1980, Top Secret, declassified (www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000278538.pdf), 8. See also Douglas MacEachin, *Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community's Record* (2008; www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record).
- ³¹ Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 34, note 54.
- ³² Khristoforov, *KGB SSSR*, 4f., 20. The representative office only appears to have been in operation from August 1978. Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 31. Details on how the intelligence relationship was established can be found in Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 120-130, 202-206, 227-229.
- ³³ The KGB used the term *Istikhbarat* as the code name for the acting head of the service which suggests a certain level of cooperation. Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 30.
- ³⁴ Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 122.
- ³⁵ Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 31; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asylum and Migration Division, *Security Services in Communist Afghanistan (1978-1992): AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD* (Brussels 2001), 7. AGSA was the acronym for *Da Afghanistan da Gato da Satane Adara*, Pashto for "Organization for the Protection of the Interests of Afghanistan".
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 8. KAM was the acronym for *Da Kargarano Amniyati Muasasa*, Pashto for "Workers' Security Service".
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.
- ³⁸ CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan, 17-19 March 1979, transcript, in: Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin 8-9 (1996/1997), 136-145. Copies of original documents stored in the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org), The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴² *Ibid.*
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁶ I. B. Berkhin, I. A. Fedosov, *Istoriya SSSR: Uchebnik dlya 9 klassa* (Moscow 1976), 247f., 333, 335.
- ⁴⁷ Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 412-415.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 419.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 440-442.
- ⁵⁰ Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 52f.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 53.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 68.
- ⁵³ Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society*, 3f.
- ⁵⁴ CPSU CC to GDR leader Honecker, communication, 1 October 1979, in: CWIHP Bulletin 8-9 (1996/1997), 156.
- ⁵⁵ Aleksandr A. Lyakhovskiy, *Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979* (Washington, DC 2007), 17, 24; Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 80. Major General Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy (1946-2009), a General Staff officer, served in 1987-89 under General of the Army Valentin Varennikov, the head of the USSR Defense Ministry Operations Group in Afghanistan. See also Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 653.
- ⁵⁶ Amstutz notes that "Amin never enjoyed good relations with the US Government during his time in power" but does not further describe the discussions held with Amin. Amstutz, *Afghanistan*, 44. On the KGB reporting see Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 450f.
- ⁵⁷ Andropov to Brezhnev, personal memorandum, n.d. [early December 1979], in: CWIHP Bulletin 8-9 (1996/1997), 159. Andropov's personal memorandum may have been based on a KGB memorandum with similar concerns addressed to Brezhnev in November 1979 and subsequently copied by Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 90.
- ⁵⁸ Andropov to Brezhnev, personal memorandum, 159.
- ⁵⁹ Lyakhovskiy, *Soviet Invasion*, 15, 30.
- ⁶⁰ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 82. Some of the orders for the deployment of the necessary troops are reprinted in Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 236-238.
- ⁶¹ S. N. Lebedev (ed.), *Istoriya rossiyskoy vneshney razvedki: Ocherki*, Vol. 6 (Moscow 2016), 82f. The chapter was written by General Vadim Alekseyevich Kirpichenko, former first deputy head of intelligence and head of the KGB First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate S (Illegals).
- ⁶² Lyakhovskiy, *Soviet Invasion*, 17. On the Soviet perception of the "new Great Ottoman Empire" project, see Michael Fredholm, *The First Jihadists*, in: Przemyslaw Gasztold, Thomas Wegener Friis (eds.), *Terrorism during the Cold War: Eastern and Western Perspectives* (Warsaw, forthcoming); *id.*, *Soviet Approaches to Muslim Extremism and Terrorism*, in: Adrian Hänni et al. (eds.), *Terrorism in the Cold War: State Support in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Sphere of Influence* (London 2020).
- ⁶³ Lyakhovskiy, *Soviet Invasion*, 21.
- ⁶⁴ Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 176/125, 12 December 1979, Concerning the situation in "A" (handwritten document), in: CWIHP Bulletin 4 (1994), 76. Available from <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113675.pdf?v=e765d5d5fc10a1a30be543914f562ed5>.
- ⁶⁵ Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York 1996), 132; Lyakhovskiy, *Soviet Invasion*, 17, 28. Gates was Director of Central Intelligence. Lyakhovskiy also cites Vladimir Kryuchkov, who in 1979 was the head of the First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence) of the KGB and later served as KGB chairman: "Ideas appeared to station American SIGINT equipment [against] the Soviet Union and possibly some types of missiles in case pro-Western forces came to power. We also knew about the development of plans by American and Pakistani special services to inflame nationalistic, Pan-Islamic sentiments in Soviet Central Asian republics using the territory of neighboring states." Lyakhovskiy, *Soviet Invasion*, 28.
- ⁶⁶ Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, in: *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), 15.-21.1.1998, 76; Gates, *Shadows*, 146.

- ⁶⁷ Brzezinski to President Carter, “Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan”, memorandum, dated 26 December 1979, available from www.gwu.edu. It remains unclear whether this memorandum was also the one referred to in the aforementioned interview in *Le Nouvel Observateur*.
- ⁶⁸ Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 451.
- ⁶⁹ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 78f.
- ⁷⁰ *New York Times*, 6.8.1972.
- ⁷¹ Isabella Ginor, Gideon Remez, *The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973: The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict* (New York 2017).
- ⁷² Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 89; Andrew, Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II*, 397.
- ⁷³ Soviet Communication to the Hungarian Leadership on the Situation in Afghanistan, dated 28 March 1979. Available from <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113160>.
- ⁷⁴ Kucherova, *KGB v Afganistane*, 44f.
- ⁷⁵ Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 201.
- ⁷⁶ Amstutz, *Afghanistan*, 268; Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 228.
- ⁷⁷ Antonio Giustozzi, Mohammad Isaqzadeh, *Policing Afghanistan: The Politics of the Lame Leviathan* (London 2013), 30.
- ⁷⁸ Snegirev, Samunin, *Virus*, 349.
- ⁷⁹ Obituary by Richard H. Cummings, *Cold War Radio Broadcasting*, 21.5.2011 (<http://coldwarradios.blogspot.se>).
- ⁸⁰ Yaacov Ro’i, *Islam in the Soviet Union: From the Second World War to Gorbachev* (London 2000), 583f.
- ⁸¹ See, e.g., *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (1996/1997), 152-154, 159.
- ⁸² Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 84.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*, 87.
- ⁸⁴ The marching orders are reprinted in Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 239f. On the military aspects of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, see Russian General Staff, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost* (Lawrence, KS 2002); Mohammad Yousaf, Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower* (Havertown, PA 1992, 2001); Amstutz, *Afghanistan*; David C. Isby, *War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan-Invasion and Resistance* (London 1989); Mark Urban, *War in Afghanistan* (New York 2010); Ali Ahmad Jalali, Lester W. Grau, *Afghan Guerrilla Warfare* (St. Paul, MN 2001).
- ⁸⁵ Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev, “Report on Events in Afghanistan on 27-28 December 1979”, dated 31.12.1979, in: *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (1996/1997), 160.
- ⁸⁶ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 92, 94-102. On the Agat Operation, see Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 101.
- ⁸⁷ Lyakhovskiy, *Soviet Invasion*, 30; Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 103f.
- ⁸⁸ Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 144.
- ⁸⁹ Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge 2010), 106.
- ⁹⁰ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC 1994), 1059.
- ⁹¹ Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary* (New York 2010), 383.
- ⁹² Keren Yarhi-Milo, *In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries*, in: *International Security* 38, No. 1 (2013), 7-51, here 24f.; citing interviews with Vance and Shulman in Melchior Laucella, *Cyrus Vance’s Worldview: The Relevance of the Motivated Perspective*, Ph.D. dissertation, Union Institute, 1996.
- ⁹³ Brzezinski to President Carter, “Reflections”.
- ⁹⁴ Garthoff, *Détente* (1982), 25-27.
- ⁹⁵ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York 2004), 58. The testimony of Charles G. Cogan, who served as the chief of the Near East and South Asia Division in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations from mid-1979 to mid-1984 and the head of the CIA’s department for counterterrorism during 1995-98, in William Karel, *CIA* (Arte France/Roche Productions, 2003), a television documentary produced by Roche Productions/Dominique Tibi.
- ⁹⁶ This development may have been anticipated by the Soviet leaders, although they failed to grasp the magnitude of support which the informal alliance eventually made available to the insurgents. See, e.g., Soviet Communication to the Hungarian Leadership on the Situation in Afghanistan, dated 28 March 1979.
- ⁹⁷ Carl Hammer (pseud.), *Tide of Terror: America, Islamic Extremism, and the War on Terror* (Boulder, CO 2003); Michael Fredholm, *The Impact of Islamic Extremism on the Geopolitics of Central Asia: Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics in the War on Terror, 2001-2002* (Stockholm 2004).
- ⁹⁸ Michael Fredholm, *Islamic Extremism as a Political Force in Central Asia: A Comparative Study of Central Asian Extremist Movements* (Stockholm 2006); *id.*, *Islam and Modernity in Contemporary Central Asia: Religious Faith versus Way of Life* (Stockholm 2007); *id.*, *The First Jihadists*; *id.*, *Soviet Approaches. On the first cross-border raids into the Soviet Union, which included the first returning jihadist foreign fighters to a country which derived from Western civilization, see Washington Times, 23.4.1987; Yousaf, Adkin, Afghanistan, 189-206.*

LIST OF FIGURES

The illustrations for this article have been selected by the JIPPS editorial committee.

- Fig. 1 Photo: Unknown Photographer, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:King_Amanullah_Khan.jpg.
- Fig. 2 Photo: Unknown Photographer, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons, [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Habibull%C4%81h_Kalak%C4%81ni_\(Bacha-i-Saqao\)_with_his_followers.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Habibull%C4%81h_Kalak%C4%81ni_(Bacha-i-Saqao)_with_his_followers.jpg).
- Fig. 3 Photo: ANBI, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mohammed_Daoud_Khan.jpg.
- Fig. 4 Photo: nacionalmarxista, <https://nacionalmarxista.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/taraki.jpg>.

- Fig. 5 Photo: ANBI, <https://ps.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%87:%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%80%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A>.jpg.
- Fig. 6 Photo: Mieremet, Rob/Anefo, Dutch National Archives, The Hague, Fotocollectie Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (ANeFo), 1945-1989, Nummer toegang 2.24.01.05 Bestanddeelnummer 925-7251, CC BY-SA 3.0 NL, via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Andrei_Gromyko_1972.jpg.
- Fig. 7 Photo: Personal Archive of Виктор Рыжов (Viktor Ryzhov), <https://vysotarb.ru/news/317/>.
- Fig. 8 Graphic: User:Sommerkom, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afghanistan_physical_en.png.
- Fig. 9 Photo: Unknown author, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hafizullah_Amin.jpg.